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Abstract: 
Many states justify their use of technology and tactics as consistent with international law. These 
appeals to legitimacy suggest that legal norms serve some role in limiting the use of force, 
particularly in promoting discrimination between combatants and civilians. The United States 
justifies drone attacks as more efficient means than the use of troops to attack suspected terrorists. 
Many civilian and military leaders argue that these attacks are more moral than alternative tactics 
because they target the individuals directly responsible for attacks on the United States and its allies. 
However, these justifications assume that the military has accurate intelligence. However, in 
Afghanistan, the military has killed many civilians in misdirected attacks. Why do civilian and military 
leaders contend that they have accurate intelligence when the empirical record shows that often 
information is erroneous and leads to unnecessary destruction and civilian casualties? 
 
To answer this question, I will focus on the U.S. use of drone attacks in Afghanistan. I will first 
evaluate civilian and military leaders’ justification of the use of targeted killings. What are their public 
justifications? I hypothesize that arguments based on efficiency and morality presume that civilian 
and government authorities have good intelligence about their targets and their participation in 
terrorist acts. Then, I examine this assumption and test the reliability of this evidence. I suspect, as 
Richard Betts has long argued, that intelligence failures are inevitable, and that intelligence is always 
going to have a margin of error. Finally, I ask how states have calculated the benefits of a policy of 
drone attacks in light of the costs of seemingly indiscriminate damage and non-combatant deaths. Is 
the policy of drone attacks really as moral and efficient as its proponents argue? I suspect that this 
tactic does lead to a short-term decrease in violence, but in the long run increases antagonism and 
anti-American violence.  
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 When President Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize at the end of 2009, he reiterated 
America’s commitment to the laws of war; “we have a moral and strategic interest in binding 
ourselves to certain rules of conduct.”1 Obama has been conscious to distinguish his record from 
President George Bush’s approach to the laws of war. In the same speech, Obama noted that he has 
reiterated the intolerance for torture and pledged to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. 
U.S. civilian and military officials have been very direct in stating their commitment to international 
law and humanitarian principles, particularly in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, before his 
untimely exit, restricted the rules of engagement to help prevent civilian casualties. 
 While this rhetorical commitment to the laws of war and protection of civilians is clear, in 
practice the American record is murky. Under President Obama, the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles, or drones, has dramatically increased. 2 Although the military primarily uses these drones 
for surveillance, they can and have fired missiles that kill militants and civilians. These weapons have 
drifted into a paradox of technology and the principles of the laws of war; while more precise 
targeting and surveillance allows the military to hit specific leaders, it also enables the military to hit 
targets in civilian areas that previously were off-limits. Some experts have argued that drones lift the 
“fog of war,” but many of these same experts caution that more surveillance data may lull the 
military into a false sense of perfect knowledge that could increase the danger to civilians. 
 Military commanders, including both Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, see the use of 
drones as critical to a new counterinsurgency strategy that will take the fight directly to the 
insurgents and provide greater protection to civilians. However, this argument rests on the 
assumption that the military can accurately interpret this intelligence. However, decades of studies of 
intelligence suggest that some kind of failure in this endeavor is inevitable. Given the importance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Full text of Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Speech,” MSNBC.com (10 December 2009): 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34360743/ (Last accessed 26 August 2010. 
2 Christopher Drew, “For Spying and Attacks, Drones Play a Growing Role in Afghanistan,” The New York 
Times (20 February 2010): Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
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civilians in counterinsurgency warfare, are the benefits of drones worth the potential risk in civilian 
lives? 
 Civilian and military leaders seem to have given a resounding yes to this question. Drone use 
is exploding in the Afghanistan conflict, and manufacturers can hardly keep up with the demand. A 
lingering question, however, is how did civilian and military leaders evaluate the inevitable risks to 
civilians? Did they simply ignore the risks and try to build in more safeguards to the system? Or, did 
they actually confront the inevitable failure and deaths of civilians and decide that was a price worth 
paying? 
 In this paper I make two main arguments. First, I argue that civilian and military leaders are 
ignoring the “intelligence gap” – the gap between perfect and actual operations of the drones. I also 
argue that leaders rationalize this ignorance, whether conscious or unconscious, by shifting of the 
burden of counterinsurgency warfare from the combatants to the civilians. Although these decision 
makers claim that they are taking proactive steps to protect civilians, events suggest that they are 
using a cost-benefit analysis that accepts civilian casualties. 
 To support this argument, I will first discuss the military’s use of drones in the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan theater and the justifications for their use. The military defends the use of 
drones as being more efficient and offering greater protection to soldiers and for their benefits to 
civilians. Then I will discuss the underlying assumption of these arguments, which are that there is 
good intelligence that allows these drones to target insurgents and avoid harming civilians. In this 
section I will draw on Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident theory and Richard Betts’s work on the 
inevitability of intelligence failures.  
 After establishing the existence of the “intelligence gap,” I present two competing arguments 
as to how the intelligence gap persists. First, civilian and military leaders may believe that they can 
beat the intelligence gap through pursuing more intelligence and safeguards. These leaders believe 
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that they are upholding a doctrine of “double intention” that requires militaries to take on additional 
risks to protect civilians. While well intentioned, they have not yet grasped the inherent problems in 
intelligence gathering that make failures inevitable. Second, civilian and military leaders may have 
grasped the inevitability of failure, but find the risk to civilians to be acceptable in the context of the 
drone’s objectives of killing militants and protecting U.S. forces. They fall back on the doctrine of 
“double effect” that only requires military forces to refrain from directly targeting civilians and to try 
to minimize civilian casualties. This cost-benefit calculation suggests that the traditional balance of 
risk in counterinsurgency, which has tilted toward the combatants, is now shifting to place a greater 
burden on civilians. 
 
The Expanding Use of Drones in Afghanistan 
 While drones were not weapons available at the outset of the Afghanistan conflict, they are 
quickly becoming one of the most important tools in the counterinsurgency. Drones have launched 
over two hundred missile and bomb strikes in late 2009 and early 2010 and are generating over four 
hundred hours of surveillance video per day.3 Colonel Jeff Kappenmann, director of the Center for 
Excellence in UAS Research Education Training at the University of North Dakota, points out, 
“There has been exponential growth in need and demand.”4 Drones are now an unmistakable part 
of the United States and NATO effort in Afghanistan. 
The primary value of the drones is in providing surveillance; they allow the military to see 
wide swaths of land and track suspected militant activity.  Air Force Major General Stephen Mueller 
is “counting on the drones to create a safer environment and give the counterinsurgency campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Drew. 
4 Gordon Lubold, “As drones multiple in Iraq and Afghanistan, so their uses,” Christian Science Monitor (2 
March 2010): Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
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time to unfold.”5 General McChrystal noted in testimony to Congress that the drones have been 
“extraordinarily effective.”6 The drones now give ground commanders an opportunity to have a 
more expansive view of terrain and to anticipate potential approaching threats. While the military 
might have considered such an expansive view a luxury at the outset of the conflict, commanders 
now expect units to fully utilize the drones’ intelligence. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley notes, 
“One thing that has happened in these conflicts that I think is a little bit irreversible is the 
expectation of combatant commanders for situational awareness 24/7/365; that appetite has been 
established and I do not see that changing.”7 Over the passage of the Afghan conflict, military 
leaders have placed drones at the center of their strategy and tactics. 
Why have drones become so central to US counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan? 
Drones answer two of the main problems that military leaders see in the conflict; they provide 
opportunities for reducing military and civilian casualties. Drones, and the surveillance they provide, 
helps identify enemy activity, particularly the laying of roadside IEDs, which insurgents have 
increasingly turned to in Afghanistan.8 They also allow tracking and observation of potential militant 
groups over a longer period of time, which ideally prevents accidental targeting of civilians. During 
General McChrystal’s tenure, he set strict limits on targets to try to minimize civilian casualties that 
were undermining the overall counterinsurgency mission. 
However, even the strictest regulations cannot prevent all mistakes. General McChrystal 
ordered new stricter rules of engagement after a drone strike attacked a home and killed twelve 
civilians, mostly children.9 Just weeks later, a Predator drone ordered a strike on a suspected 
insurgent convoy that killed twenty-three civilians. In both cases, the surveillance from the drone, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Drew. 
6 Drew. 
7 Lubold. 
8 Jim Michaels, “Intel swap is key vs. Afghan IEDs,” USA Today (7 January 2010): Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “A bold offensive, tempered by caution,” The Washington Post (16 February 2010): 
Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
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combined with observations on the ground, did not report that civilians were in the area. While 
McChrystal regretted both incidents as tragic, a simple apology for deaths during a 
counterinsurgency cannot always undo the damage to trust that is crucial to progress and ultimately 
success. While a zero-error rate is a high bar, it may be what is required in Afghanistan, especially in 
light of NATO’s past record.  
Investigations blamed the failures in these two cases on faulty intelligence analysis. Peter 
Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The Brookings Institution and author of 
Wired for War, warns of the dangers of becoming over reliant on technology and ignoring the human 
element of intelligence. “Technology gives you incredible capabilities…but mistakes still happen. 
Don’t expect technology to be the silver bullet for ethics.”10 While drones can provide voluminous 
satellite data and a powerful tool for precision strikes from the air, humans still decide on the targets 
and pull the trigger. After the February 12, 2010 attack that killed twelve civilians, General 
McChrystal gave new orders that drones could not strike targets close to homes unless troops were 
in imminent danger or there was visual confirmation that no civilians were in the homes. This 
directive, however, was not enough to stop the February 21, 2010 attack on the convoy, which led to 
the largest number of civilian deaths in the previous six months.11 The investigation of this incident 
blamed the drone operators for “inaccurate and unprofessional reporting.”12 General McChrystal, 
after apologizing for the incident, noted that he would implement a “series of training measures to 
reduce the chances of similar events.”13 Singer, however, worries that the predator drone operators, 
who are at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, may not be able to accurately interpret all of the data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Craig and Marc Kielburger, “Drones keep soldiers safe, not civilians,” The Vancouver Sun (17 May 2010): 
Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
11 David Zucchino, “Drone crew at fault in deaths,” Los Angeles Times (30 May 2010): Accessed via Lexis-
Nexis. 
12 Dexter Filkins, “U.S. assails drone operators in killing of Afghan civilians,” The International Herald Tribune 
(31 May 2010): Accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
13 Filkins. 
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coming through the numerous drone cameras; “Not everyone digging by the side of the road is 
automatically an insurgent.”14 While drones provide a valuable tool, they also face many of the same 
problems as other intelligence systems, and civilian and military leaders need to be aware of those 
inevitable system failures and take those into consideration when they decide to rely so heavily on a 
particular weapon. 
 
Inherent Risks in Intelligence Systems 
 How can we be so sure that intelligence failure is inevitable? Intuitively, we might believe 
that if civilian and military leaders continue to refine and add safeguards to the policies surrounding 
the use of drones that they could assure their safe usage with a zero-error guarantee. Organizational 
theorists are skeptical that such safeguards can eliminate all possibility of failure, and those 
safeguards may in fact generate problems of their own. Charles Perrow, in his book Normal 
Accidents, argues that no technologically advanced system can account for all variables and operate 
correctly all of the time. However, the consequences for system failure, and our ability to tolerate 
that failure, differ. If the consequences of system failure are small and manageable, then the risk is 
tolerable. However, a meltdown of a nuclear power plant, and the ensuing environmental and health 
effects, requires more serious consideration.  
 Perrow sees the greatest chances and consequences for failure in “tightly coupled” systems. 
In these systems “processes happen very fast and can’t be turned off, the failed parts cannot be 
isolated from other parts, or there is no other way to keep production going safely.”15 In a tightly 
coupled system, designers link all parts of the process together, so any one failure easily transfers 
throughout the system. Although additional safeguards can help reduce the chances of failure, they 
cannot eliminate risk, and may introduce problems of their own.  Scott Sagan, who builds on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Drew. 
15 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents (New York: Basic Books, 1984): 8. 
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Perrow’s work and applies the theory to nuclear weapons, notes that independent checks are rarely 
as independent as the designers think, and additional safeguards and oversight can make the process 
overly opaque and encourage operators to take greater risks.16 
 As an organizational theorist, Perrow also notes that people control organizations and 
systems, and they do not always follow policies or guidelines perfectly. He observes that “time an 
again warnings are ignored, unnecessary risks taken, sloppy work done, deception and downright 
lying are practiced…it occurs in all organizations, and it is part of the human condition.”17 A system 
that cannot tolerate some variance in implementation of policies will overlook possibilities for 
system failure deriving from human error. However, failures are not simply the result of human 
error, they are the inevitable result of a system that fails to account for it. 
 While Perrow’s analysis focuses on high-risk technology, Richard Betts has applied many of 
the same insights to intelligence analysis. He argues that the inherent properties of ambiguity and 
ambivalence make intelligence failures inevitable.18  Because information is often inconclusive, 
intelligence analysts can draw a number of different conclusions. And, because policymakers may 
have conflicting theories about actors and events, they may use intelligence to justify very different 
perceptions. Betts argues that this doesn’t mean the situation is hopeless; there are some reforms 
that can improve the quality of intelligence. However, he cautions that some reforms can generate 
new pathologies that may make failure more likely. Assuming the worst can lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies, allowing multiple perspectives may increase the politicization of intelligence, and 
consolidation may impede the collection of raw data because the analyst is looking for information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993): 39-40. 
17 Perrow 10. 
18 Richard Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31:1 
(October 1978): 61-89. 
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that fits within their cognitive frame.19 He argues that some risk of failure must be expected, but also 
seen in context, since failure is relatively rare in comparison to the alternative of having no 
intelligence system at all. However, if failure means the death of civilians, that may not be tolerable 
in the particular context of counterinsurgency. 
 Using both Perrow and Betts’ insights, I argue that the use of drones in the Afghanistan 
theater constitutes a tightly coupled system in which some failure is inevitable. The three criteria I 
use to establish this are: the multiple actors in the system which are to some degree dependent on 
each other (drone operators, ground commanders, intelligence analysts); the existence of policies 
and procedures for the use of force (either missiles directly from drones or other kinds of airpower); 
and the fact that these operators are humans with different levels of experience and expertise.  
 The use of drones in Afghanistan involves three primary groups of actors: the drone 
operators, the ground commanders, and the intelligence analysts. The drone operators and 
intelligence analysts operate in the United States; they see the footage from the multiple cameras on 
the drones. The drone operators can adjust the cameras to follow particular targets. Intelligence 
analysts try to understand the incoming data and interpret the behavior of potential insurgents. 
Ground commanders lead units in Afghanistan, and may be in the middle of operations when drone 
operators contact them about an approaching threat. They also count on those operators to confirm 
the nature of a potential target. All of these actors know that indecision could lead to the death of 
soldiers from an implanted IED; rash decisions could lead to attacks on civilians that also endanger 
soldiers from retaliation and revenge attacks and undermine the overall counterinsurgency strategy. 
 The military has strict restrictions on the use of airstrikes from drones. Command post 
officers analyze all of the information from the drones and follow long checklists before seeking 
authorization for a strike. They must also confer with ground commanders to confirm the targets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Betts 73. 
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and ensure that there are no civilians in the area.20 General McChrystal has emphasized the 
importance of these checks and has added new restrictions in response to civilian casualties.  
 All of the actors in this system are individuals subject to human frailties. Many of the drone 
operators currently are former Air Force fighter, bomber, or cargo plane pilots. This experience 
gives them a better perspective in analyzing the raw video footage. The Air Force, however, is 
training a new class of drone operators from computer operators and military police that might lack 
this crucial perspective. 21 Also, these drone operators often have little experience in Afghanistan, 
which limits their ability to understand what they are seeing on the screen. Ground commanders are 
managing a number of different activities at once, and may become overly reliant on the drone 
operators. Finally, as Betts notes, experience may build in perceptions or expectations that make 
quick analysis of the intelligence less objective, and could lead to failure. 
 While one incident cannot support a generalization, the February 21 missile attack on a 
convoy that killed 23 civilians accords with the description of a tightly coupled system. The drone 
operators followed the convoy for three and a half hours and did not report seeing any civilians. The 
ground commander also did not see civilians. Intelligence analysts warned about children seen near 
the trucks, but according to the official investigation, the drone operators downplayed those 
warnings. As a result of the investigation, General McChrystal disciplined the drone operators and 
some junior command officers, and ordered additional training. However, there was no 
acknowledgement of challenges in the system or the inevitability of such tragedies. In 2009, airstrikes 
accounted for sixty percent of the 596 civilian casualties caused by NATO and Afghan forces. 
Drones may be providing the military with unprecedented levels of intelligence in Afghanistan, but 
they are not perfect in terms of targeting, which leads to additional danger for civilians. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Zucchino. 
21 Zucchino. 
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Civilian and Military Leaders and the “Intelligence Gap” 
 If intelligence failures are inevitable, and civilian casualties are the outcome of that failure, 
how are civilian and military leaders weighing that outcome against the positive benefits of the 
drones? Given the seeming lack of reflection on the intelligence system surrounding drones, why do 
military and civilian policymakers continue to use them? 
 I present two possible explanations related to just war theory. One of the principles of the 
law of war is discrimination between combatants and civilians. Militaries are not to target civilians 
with attacks, since ostensibly civilians are not directly responsible for the actions of their 
governments or militaries.22 Leaders often implement this principle using the doctrine of double 
effect, which argues that militaries cannot intentionally harm or target civilians. However, Michael 
Walzer, among others, argues that the standard of double effect is too weak, because it allows 
militaries to harm civilians as long as they are not the targets of the attack. A military can bomb a 
building housing soldiers, and if civilians die, that is unfortunate but not a violation of the laws of 
war. Walzer offers an alternative doctrine of double intention, in which he argues that not only can 
militaries not target civilians, they must take proactive steps to protect civilians from harm.23  
I argue that the view of double intention is consistent with the “overcoming the fog of war” 
explanation for continued drone use. Civilian and military leaders may not recognize that failure is 
inevitable, but they take well-meaning steps to try to protect civilians. Some of these reforms may 
generate redundant or even contradictory outcomes in terms of civilian protection. However, this 
explanation reflects a commitment to international law and civilian protection, even if it leads to 
potentially misguided outcomes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Steven Lee, “Double Effect, Double Intention, and Asymmetric Warfare,” Journal of Military Ethics 3:3 
(2004): 234. 
23 Lee 237. 
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The second explanation, “shifting the balance of responsibility,” relies on the minimum 
protection of the doctrine of double effect. Civilian and military leaders will abstain from targeting 
civilians intentionally, but accept civilian casualties as a part of counterinsurgency warfare. They will 
likely blame the enemy for blending in with civilians for these casualties, and perhaps even blame the 
victims of these attacks for tacit or deliberate support for the insurgents. I would expect civilian and 
military leaders to offer rhetorical or vague prescriptions for increasing civilian protection, but little 
in terms of specifics. I would expect leaders to prioritize force protection over preventing civilian 
casualties. 
To test these two potential explanations, I will examine civilian and military defenses of the 
military use of drones in the war in Afghanistan. I examine mainstream media reports for interviews 
and testimony by civilian and military representatives. While this is only a preliminary step to 
understanding the deliberations that go on inside the government and military, these public 
statements are what younger diplomats and members of the military see as the policy advocated by 
their leaders. These statements also inform the international community about the U.S. commitment 
to protect civilians. 
 
Drones and Double Intention 
Most of the civilian and military rhetoric on drones is in line with a strategy based on double 
intention, particularly since the beginning of the Obama administration and the appointment of 
General McChrystal. McChrystal tightened to the rules of engagement to address civilian casualties, 
which were hurting the overall strategy. He argued, “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical 
victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties.”24 Evidence supporting the 
theory of double intention includes discussion of the multiple actors and steps involved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Noel Shachtman, “How the Afghanistan War Got Stuck in the Sky,” Wired (8 December 2009): 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/ff_end_air_war/all/1 (Last Accessed 26 August 2010). 
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process of turning drone intelligence into targets, a willingness to wait to confirm that targets will 
not involve civilians, and the assumption that in counter-insurgency, soldiers should take on the bulk 
of the risk. 
Descriptions of the drone targeting process emphasize the cross-checking of video data with 
satellite imagery and the tracking of targets over periods of days or even hours. Soldiers involved in 
the process highlight at least two phases – targeteering, in which operators confer with other actors 
to confirm targets, and weaponeering, in which the drone operators consult ground commanders on 
which weapons would be most appropriate for the target.25 The process includes the drone 
operators, ground commanders, military lawyers, and intelligence analysts. Singer, in his research for 
Wired for War, has witnessed this deliberation first-hand. In testimony before Congress, he observed, 
“When you discussed this [the laws of war] with people who are engaged in these operations there’s 
a series of checks and balances and consultation [with] military lawyers they have to go through for 
authorizing and conducting a strike.”26 Drone operators have expressed some frustration that 
because of this detailed process, they get to drop very few bombs.27 
While these operators may have some frustration, they do support the process and the time 
delay it creates. Col. Christopher R. Chambliss, commander of the Air Force unit in Nevada that is 
in charge of drone operations, noted that the numerous checklists allow the military to “wait for the 
right moment to make sure that we’re going to alleviate any chances for collateral damage or 
casualties.”28 Drone operators may watch a house or other structure for hours or even days to try to 
ascertain its inhabitants and activities. Col. Bill Carranza, the chief JAG officer of the US Central 
Command Combined Air and Space Operations Center (COAC), takes an active role in ensuring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Shachtman. 
26 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future 
of War, 111th Congress, 23 March 2010: Accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
27 Shachtman. 
28 Sara Carter, “Delivering Devastation,” Washington Times (7 December 2008): Accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
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that civilian protection is a priority; he stated, “My job is to make certain that we’ve done everything 
we can before an air strike to ensure that civilians, noncombatants, are safe.”29 These operators and 
intelligence analysts, who are everyday receiving more and more raw video footage as a part of the 
exploding demand for drones and data, claim that they maintain vigilance in protecting civilians. 
One of the justifications for this vigilance, as General McChrystal’s comment makes clear, is 
the importance of combatants bearing the brunt of risk in a counterinsurgency. While a doctrine of 
double effect and toleration of civilian casualties might have made sense in past conventional 
conflicts, civilians and military now seem to recognize the importance of protecting civilians and 
rebuilding trust with local elites. Lt. Col Edward Barrett, Director of Research at the Stockdale 
Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy, reiterated the importance of bearing this 
risk in testimony before Congress: “Once in war, harms must be necessary and proportionate, vis-à-
vis uninvolved civilians who maintain their rights not to be harmed, soldiers incur additional risk to 
avoid foreseeable harm to innocents and assign greater weight to this harm.”30 Barrett emphasized 
that his students at the Naval Academy understand the power and potential of drones on the 
battlefield along with their ethical implications. Even frustrated soldiers recognize the wisdom of 
civilian protection. In the immediate aftermath of the February 12 airstrike that led to civilian 
casualties, General McChrystal again tightened the rules of engagement. Lt. Col. Cal Worth, who led 
a unit that was taking fire from a sniper hidden in a building, but was denied permission to call in an 
airstrike on the sniper’s suspected location, reflected, “It’s a frustration and a challenge…The enemy 
has read the tactical directive and he understands it. He knows our rules of engagement.” But, 
Worth still supports the strict limits, “A professional fighting force needs to assume the 
preponderance of risk…That’s the way it should be in a counterinsurgency.”31 While troops may be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Carter. 
30 House Committee, Rise of the Drones. 
31 Chandrasekaran. 
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understandably frustrated by their inability to unleash the full force of the U.S. technological and 
military advantage, they understand that the only way that the war will end will be by rebuilding 
civilian trust and turning villages against the Taliban. 
 
The Reality of Double Effect 
 While there is some evidence that civilian and military leaders understand the importance of 
proactive civilian protection, there is also some concern, in both civilian and military rhetoric, and in 
events, that suggests than underneath a veneer of double intention is a fall back of double effect. 
Harold Koh, prominent international lawyer and strong critic of the Bush administration’s policies 
in the War on Terror, now finds himself in the awkward position of defending President Obama’s 
increase in drone usage, both by the military and the CIA. In his March 2010 speech to the 
American Society of International Law, Koh argued that “In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its 
associated forces – including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – 
great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only 
legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.”32 This statement 
reflects the minimal commitment to double effect - continue to target high-value individuals, and try 
to minimize casualties, rather than taking proactive steps to protect civilians, even if it is at some 
cost to military operations. There is no acknowledgment of the role of that intelligence plays or the 
inevitable risks of the incomplete or incorrect information. Civilian and military leaders have 
endorsed the doctrine of double effect through their celebration of drones as providing power 
without vulnerability, placing a priority on force protection, and blaming civilian casualties on the 
enemy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Harold Hongju Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” (25 March 2010): 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (Last accessed 26 August 2010).	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 The demand for drones over Afghanistan has increased exponentially, and for some civilian 
and military leaders, the reason is firepower logic that emerged during Vietnam – “send a bullet 
instead of a man.” A senior Defense Department official celebrated the increase in drone use by 
noting their ability to replace frontline forces: “The technology allows us to project power without 
vulnerability…You don’t have to deploy as many people. And in the modern age you want as little 
stuff forward as long as you can achieve the effects as if you had a lot of people forward.”33 This 
reluctance to accept risk on the battlefield to the combatants seems to presume that the drones can 
be as precise as troops on the ground; there is little recognition of the inevitable risk posed to 
civilians. 
 Civilian and military officials echo these sentiments in reinforcing the importance of force 
protection. Lt. Col Walt Manwill, chief of combat operations for the COAC, argues, “We are here to 
save our troops first and foremost. We’re also constantly searching for insurgents, small groups out 
of place or enemy movement to aid commanders on the ground and provide intelligence.”34 While 
the JAG officer for the COAC may be focus on preventing civilian casualties, the combat officer 
focuses on force protection. This gap suggests there may be some disconnect in Gen. McChrystal’s 
(now Gen. Petraeus’s) counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes eliminating civilian casualties. 
 When civilian casualties do occur, the military has a mixed record of response. While the 
Oruzgan killings resulted in an investigation and disciplinary action for the drone operators and 
junior command officers involved, military spokesmen blamed earlier civilian casualties on the 
enemy. In 2007, an airstrike against an al Qaeda leader led to the deaths of seven Afghan children. 
While the military expressed regret at the deaths, Maj. Chris Belcher, the Army public affairs offer, 
blamed the “cowardice” of Al Qaeda. A coalition press release argued, “witness statements taken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Julian Barnes, “Military Drones’ Ability to ‘Stare’ Proves Revolutionary,” Pittsburg Post-Gazette (8 November 
2009): Accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
34 Carter. 
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early this morning clearly put the blame on the suspected terrorists, saying that if the children 
attempted to go outside they were beaten and pushed away from the door.”35 Unnamed military 
officials later disclosed to an NBC reporter that the Army knew that children were in the building 
but believed that the commander was a “high value target” that justified the risk.36 The lack of 
consistency in the military’s response to civilian casualties suggests that there is not agreement on 
the military’s responsibilities to civilians. 
 One might argue that Obama’s decision to implement a strategy in Afghanistan address 
some of these prior cases of civilian casualties. Gen. McChrystal did take swift action in early 
February 2010 when a drone airstrike hit a house and killed civilians. However, only weeks later, 
another drone operator ordered a strike on a convoy that killed twenty-three civilians. The 
investigative report noted that the predator drone operators downplayed intelligence analyst 
warnings of children in the area. While Gen. McChrystal ordered investigations and revised training 
schedules, he did not address the inevitable risk to civilians inherent in the drone intelligence system. 
Although much of the rhetoric at the highest levels seems to support a doctrine of double intention, 
events suggest an underlying acceptance of double effect. 
 
The Importance of the Protecting Civilians in Counterinsurgency 
 Civilian and military leaders acknowledge the importance of reducing civilian casualties to 
the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The increasing reliance on drones, 
however, suggests a lack of understanding of the inevitable risks associated with the unmanned 
technology. While some ground commanders, and legal analysts, see little difference between drones 
and traditional missile strikes, a big difference comes in the assessments of the ability of those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Barry Bearak and Taimoor Shaw, “7 Children Killed in Coalition Airstrike on Religious Compound in 
Afghanistan,” New York Times (19 June 2007): Accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
36 Jim Miklaszewski, et al, “Attack that killed kids targeted al-Qaida leader,” MSNBC.com (19 June 2007): 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19318805 (Last accessed 26 August 2010). 
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systems to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and proportionality. When Gen. 
McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan to implement President Obama’s new counterinsurgency strategy, 
he severely curtailed airstrikes as a way to reduce civilian casualties. The rise in the use, and 
dependence on drone technology, will either begin a new cycle of civilian deaths and defections to 
the Taliban or a more serious discussion in civilian and military circles about the inherent risks in 
drone weapons systems and the kind of approach to civilians that is appropriate in a 
counterinsurgency. 
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